The wireless sensor network is a wireless network of self-organized sensors that are distributed at intervals. These sensors are used to group measurements of specific physical quantities or environmental conditions such as temperature, sound, vibration, pressure, motion, or pollutants at various locations. Energy efficiency to extend a wireless sensor network's lifetime should be considered in all network design areas, including hardware and software. Wireless sensor networks may be used in critical applications and transmit sensitive data, so they need methods to secure the data. Secure routing in wireless sensor networks is vital due to the need for data confidentiality, integrity, energy efficiency, authentication, and resilience against attacks. It ensures sensitive data remains private, prevents tampering, optimizes energy usage, verifies node authenticity, and defends against attacks. This paper presents a secure routing method in wireless sensor networks. In the proposed method, due to the nodes' processing limitations and to ensure the security of the exchanged messages, the lightweight Columnar transposition cipher method is used. The routing process is done hop by hop, and the next hop is selected based on the parameters of remaining energy, distance to the base station, and node traffic. The proposed routing method is implemented by MATLAB and compared with SMEER and KID-SASR methods. The simulation results show a reduction of end-to-end delay of 50% and 38%, reduction of energy consumption of 39% and 20%, reduction of packet loss rate, and increased number of live nodes by 66% and 59% compared to SMEER and KID-SASR.

In this paper we introduce the notions of fuzzy transposition hyper groups and fuzzy regular relations and investigate their basic properties. We also study fuzzy quotient hyper groups of a fuzzy transposition hyper group.

Quantum Cellular Automata (QCA) represents an emerging technology at the nanotechnology level. Nowadays, many applications of QCA technology are introduced and cryptography can be an interesting application of QCA technology. The original encryption algorithm for GSM was A5/1. Here, we have implemented the A5/1 stream cipher using QCA technology. Simulation results are obtained from software of QCA Designer.

3D is a 512-bit block cipher whose design is inspired from the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Like the AES, each round of 3D is composed of 4 transformations including a round-key addition, a byte-wise substitution, a byte-wise shuffle and an MDS matrix multiplication. In 3D, two distinct byte-wise permutations are employed for odd and even rounds. In this paper, using concepts from graph theory, we design a unified byte permutation for both odd and even rounds with the same diffusion property as the original cipher. The main advantage of this new transformation is in hardware implementation of the cipher where with less resources we can speed up the encryption/decryption process.

Impossible differential attack is one of the strongest methods of cryptanalysis on block ciphers. In block ciphers based on SPN (substitution permutation network), the only layer that resists the difference is the nonlinear layer. Obviously, paying attention to the features of nonlinear layer is important for the sake of preventing statistical attacks, such as the differential attack. Therefore, this layers’ features regarding attack tolerance should be carefully investigated. The existence of such a nonlinear layer with the required features and applying it in the entire length of the block can lead to more resistance against differential attacks. Over the past few years, a new set of block ciphers based on SPN has been introduced, in which the nonlinear layer is applied only to a particular part of the state. In this paper, a general framework for finding the characteristics of the impossible difference in this type of new block cipher is presented. Contrary to the previous miss-in-the-middle methods, which are used to find the impossible differences, the method presented in this article is independent of the feature of linear layer of the algorithm and allows the attacker to systematically find the effective impossible differential even in cryptographic algorithms with highly complex linear layer. In order to demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed method, the family of LowMC ciphers that use bitwise linear layer are examined in this paper and based on this framework some impossible differential characteristics are proposed for some versions of reduced LowMCs. This proposed impossible differential characteristics can be easily applied in key-recovery attacks based on the framework presented in this paper. As an example, we show that based on the impossible difference characteristic obtained for 63 rounds of the LowMC (128, 128, 2, 128), a key-recovery attack is applied to the 64-round of this algorithm. In proposed attack, the complexity of memory is 289, the complexity of the time is 2123. 7, and the complexity of the data is equal to 2123. 1 of the chosen plain text.

Impossible difference attack is a powerful tool for evaluating the security of block ciphers based on finding a differential characteristic with the probability of exactly zero. The linear layer diffusion rate of a cipher plays a fundamental role in the security of the algorithm against the impossible difference attack. In this paper, we show an efficient method, which is independent of the quality of the linear layer, can find impossible differential characteristics of Zorro block cipher. In other words, using the proposed method, we show that, independent of the linear layer feature and other internal elements of the algorithm, it is possible to achieve effective impossible differential characteristic for the 9-round Zorro algorithm. Also, based on represented 9-round impossible differential characteristic, we provide a key recovery attack on reduced 10-round Zorro algorithm. In this paper, we propose a robust and different method to find impossible difference characteristics for Zorro cipher, which is independent of the linear layer of the algorithm. The main observation in this method is that the number of possible differences in that which may occur in the middle of Zorro algorithm might be very limited. This is due to the different structure of Zorro. We show how this attribute can be used to construct impossible difference characteristics. Then, using the described method, we show that, independent of the features of the algorithm elements, it is possible to achieve efficient 9-round impossible differential characteristics of Zorro cipher. It is important to note that the best impossible differential characteristics of the AES encryption algorithm are only practicable for four rounds. So the best impossible differential characteristic of Zorro cipher is far more than the best characteristic of AES, while both algorithms use an equal linear layer. Also, the analysis presented in the article, in contrast to previous analyzes, can be applied to all ciphers with the same structure as Zorro, because our analysis is independent of the internal components of the algorithm. In particular, the method presented in this paper shows that for all Zorro modified versions, there are similarly impossible differential characteristics. Zorro cipher is a block cipher algorithm with 128-bit block size and 128-bit key size. Zorro consists of 6 different sections, each with 4 rounds (24 rounds in all). Zorro does not have any subkey production algorithm and the main key is simply added to the value of the beginning state of each section using the XOR operator. Internal rounds of one section do not use the key. Similar to AES, Zorro state matrix can be shown by a 4 × 4 matrix, which each of these 16 components represent one byte. One round of Zorro, consists of four functions, which are SB*, AC, SR, and MC, respectively. The SB* function is a nonlinear function applying only to the four bytes in the first row of the state matrix. Therefore, in the opposite of the AES, where the substitution box is applied to all bytes, the Zorro substitution box only applies to four bytes. The AC operator is to add a round constant. Finally, the two SR and MC transforms are applied to the state matrix, which is, respectively, the shift row and mixed column used in the AES standard algorithm. Since the analyzes presented in this article are independent of the substitution properties, we do not use the S-box definition used by Zorro. Our proposed model uses this Zorro property that the number of possible differences after limited rounds can be much less than the total number of possible differences. In this paper, we introduce features of the Zorro, which can provide a high bound for the number of possible values of an intermediate difference. We will then present a model for how to find Zorro impossible differential characteristics, based on the limitations of the intermediate differences and using the miss-in-the-middle attack. Finally, we show that based on the proposed method, it is possible to find an impossible differential characteristic for 9 rounds of algorithms with a Zorro-like structure and regardless of the linear layer properties. Also, it is possible to apply the key recovery attack on 10 rounds of the algorithm. So, regardless of the features of the used elements, it can be shown that this number of round of algorithms is not secure even by changing the linear layer.

Reconfigurable computing offers advantages over traditional hardware and software implementation of computational algorithms. It is based on using reprogrammable devices, which can be reconfigured after fabrication to implement the desired algorithm.Reconfigurable computing systems can take advantage of hardware but still maintains the flexibility of software.Particular applications, including encryption, are specifically well suited to these systems. In this paper, we implemented multiple cryptographic algorithms, namely DES, LOKI, DESX, Biham-DES, and SnOES on a reconfigurable hardware so that each algorithm could be replaced by another with low reconfiguration overhead time. The hardware reconfiguration time is about 2.6 ms, which is comparable with the other systems overhead.The main reason for the lower reconfiguration time is that our architecture is partially reconfigurable. Our implementation resulted in a high flexibility but comparable ciphering rate in comparison with previous implementations on field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). We achieved the ciphering rate of 14080 Mbps on Xilinx 2V6000-5 FPGA.